Operation Safe Corridor: Matawalle’s defeatist solution

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PART of the reason terrorism has endured in Nigeria is the mindset of some government officials. Instead of projecting resolve, they often speak the language of appeasement, resignation, or outright helplessness.

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From the Chief of Defence Staff, Olufemi Oluyede, who reportedly described terrorists as “prodigal sons” deserving an opportunity to repent, to the National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, who suggested dialogue with surrendered fighters because they were “our brothers,” some officials seem only a step away from trivialising one of the gravest threats facing the country.

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The latest example is the Minister of State for Defence, Bello Matawalle. The former governor of troubled Zamfara State told BBC Hausa that “it’s only God who could bring an end to the spate of insecurity ravaging Nigeria, alongside collective prayers and efforts.”

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That statement is not merely disappointing; it is profoundly irresponsible.

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A senior government official entrusted with helping to secure the country cannot afford to outsource his constitutional responsibility to divine intervention. Nigerians did not create a Defence Ministry so that its occupants could surrender to fate.

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Matawalle’s remarks betray a dangerous defeatism. If the government itself believes only God can end insecurity, then what exactly is the purpose of military budgets, intelligence agencies, defence procurement, and thousands of soldiers risking their lives on the battlefield?

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Matawalle has hardly demonstrated the qualities of a committed anti-insurgency strategist.

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During his tenure as governor of Zamfara State, Governor Dauda Lawal accused him of maintaining links with bandits. Allegations surfaced that vehicles were purchased for terrorists and that some of them were even seen within government circles.

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How then did such a figure emerge as Minister of State for Defence? The answer appears rooted more in political calculations ahead of 2027 than in competence or experience. The result is that a sensitive security office is occupied by someone whose public statements inspire little confidence.

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His comments also send the wrong message to soldiers on the front lines. Troops confronting terrorists daily deserve leaders who project determination, not surrender.

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Equally troubling is the government’s continued emphasis on rehabilitating terrorists while many of their victims remain neglected. It is difficult to justify spending public resources to train, educate, and financially support former insurgents while displaced communities struggle with poverty, trauma, and abandonment.

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Operation Safe Corridor, which began under the Muhammadu Buhari administration in 2015, emerged from the de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration programme established to absorb former terrorists. Some beneficiaries eventually became informants and moles within the system.

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Even before that, the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan established the Countering Violent Extremism programme, codenamed the National Security Corridor, in 2013. Its objective was to rehabilitate former terrorists. It achieved little.

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The current programme provides vocational training, basic education, and religious re-orientation for so-called low-risk defectors before their reintegration into society. Since 2015, more than 124,000 fighters and dependants have reportedly surrendered.

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Yet serious concerns persist.

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Many retired military officers have criticised the programme. Amnesty International has questioned the transparency of the process and expressed fears that some supposedly repentant terrorists eventually return to violence.

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Earlier this year, when the government announced plans to reintegrate 744 repentant terrorists into society, widespread public outrage followed.

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The Coordinator of Operation Safe Corridor, Yusuf Ali, defended the programme, arguing that beneficiaries undergo psychological, religious, and social rehabilitation before re-entering society.

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But many Nigerians remain unconvinced.

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Communities devastated by insurgency frequently view the programme as a profound injustice. Victims are seldom consulted. Their pain receives little attention while their tormentors are offered training, counselling, and opportunities for reintegration.

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In communities such as Bama in Borno State, former insurgents continue to be viewed with suspicion. Many residents believe they have not genuinely renounced violence. Some use the amnesty period to recover from hunger, exhaustion, and military pressure before returning to the forests, sometimes carrying valuable intelligence back to their former groups.

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What terrorists and bandits require is sustained force, effective intelligence, and strategic military pressure—not official sermons.

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When Israel launched military operations against Lebanon, it did not substitute prayer for strategy. When United States Navy SEALs entered Pakistan in May 2011 and killed Osama bin Laden, they did not wait for divine intervention before acting.

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Many of the militants operating in Nigeria are not even citizens. Some come from neighbouring countries such as Mali and Niger and possess little attachment to Nigeria or its future.

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The security establishment should therefore focus on securing the country’s porous borders, strengthening intelligence gathering, and dismantling the networks that sustain terrorism.

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Appeasement is not a strategy. Surrender is not leadership. Invoking God as the primary solution to insecurity amounts to an admission of failure.

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Human beings were endowed with intelligence, institutions, and the capacity to solve problems. Governments exist precisely to provide security.

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Instead of defeatist rhetoric, the government should intensify intelligence operations, identify and eliminate fifth columnists within the military, recruit additional security personnel, invest in advanced weapons systems, secure the borders, and pursue terrorists relentlessly.

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Nigeria needs leaders who inspire confidence, not officials who publicly confess helplessness.

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